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The rise of the algorithmic society has led to a paradigmatic shift where constitutional 
liberties granted to online platforms have turned into newfound powers. This situation 
is not only the result of new technological developments but also of the recognition of 
the online platforms' exclusive role in implementing an online public regulatory 
framework, as the cases of content management and the right to be forgotten online 
illustrate. Behind such delegated competences, online intermediaries can exercise 
sovereign powers over their online spaces through instruments based on private law 
and technology. In this scenario, the liberal constitutional approach adopted in relation 
to online platforms has played a crucial role in increasing the possibilities for these 
actors to affect individuals' fundamental rights. This work will address two potential 
solutions to limit the extent of such private powers from a (digital) constitutional law 
perspective. The first will focus on the introduction of new user rights whose aim is to 
regulate online platforms' decision-making processes and provide new legal remedies 
against such decisions. The insertion of new procedural rights in the online 
environment, including, for example, the obligation to explain the reasons behind 
platforms' decisions, would be appropriate in order to reduce the opacity of automated 
decision-making processes and foster human awareness in the algorithmic society. The 
second solution will question the doctrine of horizontal effect in order to establish a 
mechanism to enforce constitutional rights vis-à-vis online platforms that operate in a 
global framework.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, globalisation has challenged the boundaries of 
constitutional law by calling traditional legal categories into question.1 The 
internet has played a pivotal role in this process.2 On the one hand, this new 
protocol of communication has enabled the expanded exercise of individuals' 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression.3 On the other hand, unlike 
other ground-breaking channels of communication, the cross-border nature 
of the internet has weakened the power of constitutional states, not only in 
terms of the territorial application of sovereign powers vis-à-vis other states 
but also with regard to the protection of fundamental rights in the online 
environment. It should come as no surprise that, from a transnational 
constitutional perspective, one of the main concerns of states is the 
                                                 
1 Mark Tushnet, 'The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law' (2009) 49 
Virginia Journal of International Law 985. 
2  Oreste Pollicino and Marco Bassini, 'The Law of the Internet between 
Globalisation and Localization' in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari 
(eds), Transnational Law. Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge 
University Press 2016). 
3 Jack Balkin, 'Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society' (2004) 79 New York University Law 
Review 1. 
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limitations placed on their powers to address global phenomena occurring 
outside their territory.4 
The development of the internet has allowed new businesses to exploit the 
opportunities deriving from the use of a low-cost global communication 
technology for delivering services without any physical burden, regardless of 
their location. In particular, the predominant role of online hosting 
providers, in this work referred to as 'platforms', cannot be neglected.5 
Although the activities of such platforms are based on different business 
models (e.g. Facebook and Google),6 they do not produce or create content 
but instead host and organise their users' content for profit. These platforms 
should therefore be considered as service providers rather than content 
providers.7 
Furthermore, due to the development of new profiling technologies such as 
pattern recognition mechanisms, platforms can now increasingly rely on 
more pervasive control over information and data. These algorithm-based 
technologies allow private actors to process huge amounts of information,8 
with the result that they now know almost everything about individuals and 
their activities online, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal has indirectly 
shown. 
Even more importantly, however, the processing of data has entrusted these 
actors with almost exclusive control over online content, transforming their 
                                                 
4 Eric C Ip, 'Globalization and the Future of the Law of the Sovereign State' (2010) 
8(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 636. 
5 Anne Helmond, 'The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform 
Ready' (2015) 1(2) Social Media + Society 1. 
6 Geoffrey G Parker, Marshall W Van Alstyne and Sangett P Choudary, Platform 
Revolution – How networked markets are transforming the economy – and how to make 
them work for you (WW Norton & Company Inc 2017); Nick Srnicek, 'The 
challenges of platform capitalism: Understanding the logic of a new business 
model' (2017) 23(4) Juncture 254. 
7 For a definition of online platforms, see Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary (n 6). 
8 Solon Barocas, Sophie Hood and Malte Ziewitz, 'Governing Algorithms: A 
Provocation Piece' (2013) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2245322> accessed 20 June 
2018; Caryn Devins, Teppo Felin, Stuart Kauffman and Roger Koppl, 'The Law and 
Big Data' (2017) 27 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 357. 
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role into something more than a mere intermediary.9 The 'information 
society', which developed at the end of the 1990s, has evolved into the 
'algorithmic society' through the emergence of hosting providers such as 
YouTube and Facebook.10 
This evolution calls into question the role of online platforms, moving the 
debate from a private to a public law perspective,11 more specifically to a 
digital constitutional one.12 Indeed, inter alia, modern constitutionalism aims 
to, on the one hand, protect fundamental rights, and, on the other hand, limit 
the emergence of powers outside constitutional control.13 A new wave of 
(digital) constitutionalism is rising as a shield against the discretionary 
exercise of power by online platforms in the digital environment. 
                                                 
9 Jacqueline D Lipton, 'Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange' (2012) 
64(5) Florida Law Review 1337. See also Georgios N Yannopoulos, 'The Immnuity 
of Internet Intermediaries Reconsidered?' in Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano 
Floridi, The Responsibilities of Online Service Providers (Springer 2017). 
10 Jack Balkin, 'Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation' (2018) 51 University of California 
Davis 1151 1. 
11 Recently, scholars have approached the public role of online platforms from 
different perspectives. See e.g. Natali Helberger, Jo Pierson and Thomas Poell 
'Governing Online Platforms: from Contested to Cooperative Responsibility' 
(2018) 34(1) The Information Society 1; Kate Klonick, 'The New Governors: the 
People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech' (2018) 131 Harvard Law 
Review 1598; Orla Lynskey, 'Regulating Platform Power' (2017) LSE Legal Studies 
Working Paper 1 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73404/1/WPS2017-01_Lynskey.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2018; Julia E. Cohen, 'Law for the Platform Economy' (2017) 
51 UC Davis Law Review 133. 
12 Nicolas Suzor, 'Digital Constitutionalism: Using the Rule of Law to Evaluate the 
Legitimacy of Governance by Platforms' (2018) 4(3) Social Media + Society 1-11; 
Dennis Redeker, Lex Gill and Urss Gasser, 'Towards digital constitutionalism? 
Mapping attempts to craft an Internet Bill of Rights' (2018) 80 International 
Communication Gazette 302. 
13 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’ (2012) NYU School of 
Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-87 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722771&rec=1&srcabs=1760963&alg=1&pos=1> accessed 2 
April 2019; Joseph H. H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
2019} Fundamental Rights Online 69 
 
Online platforms play a crucial role in addressing the challenges faced by the 
public enforcement of user rights.14 The activity of content removal and the 
enforcement of the right to be forgotten online are only two examples 
illustrating how public actors have delegated regulatory tasks to private 
actors in order to ensure the effective implementation of public policies 
online.15  
In fact, online platforms enjoy a broad margin of discretion in deciding how 
to implement such functions. Platforms are free to define and interpret users' 
fundamental rights according to their legal, economic and ethical framework 
due to the fact that there are no laws or regulations currently in place to 
prevent them from doing so. For instance, the decision to remove and 
consequently delete a video from YouTube is a clear interference with the 
uploading user's right to freedom of expression but could also preserve other 
fundamental rights such as their right to privacy. To some extent, this 
privately driven activity mirrors the exercise of judicial balancing and public 
enforcement carried out by public authorities.  
However, this 'delegation' of responsibilities is not the only concern at stake. 
By virtue of the algorithmic architecture, online platforms can also perform 
autonomous quasi-public functions without the need to rely on the oversight 
of a public authority, such as for the enforcement of their Terms of Services 
(hereinafter 'ToS'). In both cases, online platforms can set the rules for 
enforcing and balancing users' fundamental rights by using automated 
decision-making processes without any constitutional safeguards.16 This may 
be problematic from a constitutional standpoint as private actors are not 
bound to respect fundamental rights due to the lack of regulation translating 
                                                 
14 Commission, 'Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and 
Challenges for Europe' COM (16) 288 final. 
15 Niva Elkin-Koren and Eldar Haber, 'Governance by Proxy: Cyber Challenges to 
Civil Liberties' (2017) 82(1) Brooklyn Law Review 105. 
16 Regarding technological enforcement, see, in particular, Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0: 
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 2006); Tarleton Gillespie, 'The 
Relevance of Algorithms' in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J Boczkowski and Kirsten A 
Foot, Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society (MIT 
Press 2014); Helen Nissenbaum, 'From Preemption to Circumvention: If 
Technology Regulates, Why Do We Need Regulation (and Vice Versa)?' (2011) 26 
Berkley Technology Law Journal 1367. 
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constitutional principle into binding norms. In other words, the enforcement 
and balancing of fundamental rights in the algorithmic society is increasingly 
privatised.  
This paper attempts to go beyond the main description of the situation at 
stake by proposing solutions to limit the extent of private powers online from 
a constitutional perspective. In order to achieve this objective, the aim of this 
paper is twofold. Firstly, the paper highlights the reasons why the recognised 
economic freedoms of online platforms have turned into more extensive 
forms of private power. In particular, the main claim is that the liberal 
constitutional approach adopted by the EU and the US during a phase of 
technological acceleration has allowed online platforms to acquire new areas 
of power, particularly due to the development of algorithmic technologies. 
Secondly, having explained this shift from a private to a public law 
perspective, the paper proposes potential solutions to the problem of how to 
address the exercise of delegated and autonomous powers by private actors 
online. This is done by questioning the above-mentioned liberal 
constitutional approach in order to protect the fundamental rights of 
individuals against the behaviours of private actors operating in a global 
framework. 
From a transnational constitutional standpoint, this paper analyses the 
liberal constitutional approach adopted by the EU and the US in regard to 
online platforms.17 In the first part of the paper, the shift from the latter's 
economic freedoms to areas of power is described from an economic, legal 
(constitutional) and technological perspective. The second part of the paper 
analyses delegated powers by focusing on the examples of online content 
management and the right to be forgotten online. Regarding autonomous 
power, the role of ToS as an instrument of private policy online will be 
described. Finally, the paper addresses two – potential – cumulative solutions 
looking at the latest trends in the legal frameworks of the EU and the US. The 
                                                 
17 Transnational constitutional law emerges due to the influence of global actors such 
as online platforms on the application of fundamental rights across the globe. See 
Peer Zumbansen and Kinnari Bhatt 'Transnational Constitutional Law' (2018)  
King's College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research  
Paper Series 5 <https://repub.eur.nl/pub/106209/TCL-paper-BhattZumb.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2018. 
2019} Fundamental Rights Online 71 
 
first proposal focuses on regulating online platforms' decision-making 
processes by introducing procedural safeguards. The second solution focuses 
on the horizontal effect doctrine and its limits. The aim is to define a 
mechanism to enforce constitutional rights vis-à-vis online platforms which 
formally are private actors, but increasingly pursue public tasks. 
II. FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE AS FROM ATOMS TO BITS: THE REASONS 
FOR A GOVERNANCE SHIFT 
In the 1990s, Negroponte defined the increasing level of digitisation as the 
movement from atoms to bits.18 In general, a bit is only the sum of 0 and 1 but, 
as in the case of atoms, the interrelations among bits can build increasingly 
complex structures.19 Such a dichotomy demonstrates a clear shift from 
ownership of things to ownership of information.20 The move from the 
industrial to the information society is mainly due to the move from 
rivalrousness to non-rivalrousness of traditional products and services.21 Put 
another way, the bits exchanged through the internet have driven the shift 
from analogue to digital technologies by creating revolutionary models to 
market and deliver traditional products or services. The result is that the 
economy is no longer based only on the creation of value through production 
but through information.  
In this hurricane of technological developments,22 the overwhelming 
majority of constitutional states has adopted a liberal approach with respect 
to the regulation of the internet.23 The rapid expansion of new digital 
technologies combined with the failure of public actors to promptly address 
                                                 
18 Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (Alfred A Knopf 1995). 
19 Bill Gates, The Road Ahead (Viking Press 1995). 
20 John P Barlow, ‘The Economy of Ideas: Selling Wine Without Bottles on the 
Global Net’ in P Ludlow (ed), High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues 
in Cyberspace (MIT Press 1999). 
21 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (Yale University Press 2006); Andrew 
Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (Oxford University Press 
2013). 
22 Rosa Hartmut, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity (Columbia University 
Press 2013).  
23 John G Palfrey, ‘Four Phases of Internet Regulation’ (2010) 77(3) Social Research 
981. 
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these phenomena are two of the main arguments which have led the first 
'cyberspace' libertarian scholars to consider the dimension of the cyberspace 
as being outside the scope of influence of public actors.24 In particular, in his 
'Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace',25 Barlow maintains that the 
digital space is a new world separated from the atomic one. As highlighted by 
Johnson and Post at the end of the 1990s, '[c]yberspace has no territorially-
based boundaries, because the cost and speed of message transmission on the 
Net is almost entirely independent of physical location'.26 In their view, the 
lack of physical boundaries lent support to the claim that cyberspace should 
constitute an independent jurisdiction separate from that of the state.27 
The well-known debate about the extraterritorial extension of national 
jurisdiction as resulting from the case Licra v. Yahoo France in 2000 seemed 
to confirm the reasoning of the two US scholars.28 Indeed, according to the 
theories of Johnson and Post, the only effective approach for cyberspace 
would be a system of free market regulation. By allowing users to choose the 
rules they find appropriate, new legal institutions would emerge from the 
digital realm.29 A 'decentralised and emergent law', resulting from customary 
or collective private action, would form the basis for creating a democratic 
set of rules applicable to the digital community.30 In other words, Johnson 
                                                 
24 Among the most relevant scholars, see John Perry Barlow, David Johnson, David 
Post and Tom W Bell. 
25 John P Barlow, ‘A Declaration of Independence of the Cyberspace’ (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 1996) <www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence> accessed 16 
June 2018. 
26 David R Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace’ (1996) 48(5) Stanford Law Review 1371. 
27 Ibid 1367. 
28 Licra et UEJF v. Yahoo Inc and Yahoo France TGI Paris 22 May 2000. See Joel R 
Reidenberg, ‘Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet’ (2001/2002) 42 Jurimetrics 
261; Yahoo!, Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme 169 F Supp 2d 1181 (ND Cal 2001). See 
Christine Duh, ‘Yahoo Inc. v. LICRA’ (2002) 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
359. Regarding the topic of Internet jurisdiction, see Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the 
Internet (Cambridge University Press 2007); Dan J B Svantesson, Solving the Internet 
Jurisdiction Puzzle (Oxford University Press 2017). 
29 Johnson and Post (n 26). 
30 David R Johnson and David Post, ‘And How Shall the Net be Governed?’ in Brian 
Kahin and James Keller (eds), Coordinating the Internet (MIT Press 1997). 
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and Post's proposal represents a bottom-up approach: rather than relying on 
traditional public law-making power to set the rules of cyberspace, every 
single digital community should be capable of participating in the creation of 
the new rules governing their own digital world.31 
However, this scenario is not reality today. Instead of a democratic 
decentralised society, the potentialities of the internet have created an 
oligopoly of private entities who both control information and determine 
how people exchange it.32 As such, the platform-based regulation of the 
internet has prevailed over the community-based model.33 
In the past, public actors traditionally exercised control over the information 
marketplace through different systems such as public registers of data and 
ownership of the media. In fact, in some cases, the present news media 
industry continues to be subject to forms of public control even in those 
states that recognise a high level of freedom for businesses in conducting 
economic activities.34 Because they were the only entities able to exploit the 
power to gather and store data and information about people from different 
sources, the monopoly on knowledge was a prerogative of public actors.  
In the case of the internet, however, the extension of such public control over 
information has not been complete for at least three reasons. First, unlike the 
                                                 
31 The criticism to the democratic development of a set of rules related to the digital 
space comes from the absence of a unique community in the digital environment. 
See Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton University Press 2009). From 
another perspective, according to Reed, this element was the ‘Cyberspace fallacy’. 
Reed recognised that, although the interpretation of the digital space by the 
Cyberlibertarian doctrine is not completely wrong, the weak point depends on the 
physical substance of the individual that acts in the digital environment, which is 
located in one precise jurisdiction. See Chris Reed, Internet Law: Text and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 174-175. 
32 Robin Mansell and Michele Javary, ‘Emerging Internet Oligopolies: A Political 
Economy Analysis’ in Arthur S Miller, Warren J Samuels (eds), An Institutionalist 
Approach to Public Utilities Regulation (Michigan State University Press 2002); Alex 
Moazed and Nicholas L Johnson, Modern Monopolies: What It Takes to Dominate the 
21st Century Economy (St Martin’s Press 2016). 
33 Orly Lobel, ‘The Law of the Platforms’ (2016) 101 Minnesota Law Review 87. 
34 Simeon Djankov, Caralee Mcliesh, Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Who 
Owns the Media?’ (2003) 45 Journal of Law and Economics 341. 
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control over traditional channels of communication bound by scarce 
resources, the internet offers a quasi-unlimited space, increasing the 
complexities in monitoring its boundaries and decreasing the need to ensure 
media pluralism through regulations.35  
Second, whilst traditional channels of communication are located in a 
specific territory without the possibility to easily reach the global 
community, the cross-border nature of the internet has made it difficult for 
constitutional states to extend their sovereign powers over phenomena 
occurring outside their territory. In other words, although states are 
considered the only legitimate authorities to implement binding norms and 
enforce them, this idea of exclusive control is strongly challenged at the 
international level where states cannot exercise their sovereign powers 
externally.36  
Even more importantly, the marginalisation of constitutional states is also 
the result of complex internet governance structures, based on the mutual 
influence of different stakeholders at the international level.37 Although 
states have maintained the ability to rely on remedies of last resort such as 
                                                 
35 See, however, Robin Mansell, ‘New Media Competition and Access: The Scarcity-
Abundance Dialectic’ 1999 1(2) New Media and Society 155. 
36 The above-mentioned US case Yahoo v Licra (n 28) has shown the challenges raised 
by judicial orders with extraterritorial scope. Another example is the Equustek case 
in which the Canadian Supreme Court ordered Google to remove links from its 
global search engine. According to the Supreme Court: '[t]he interlocutory 
injunction in this case is necessary to prevent the irreparable harm [to Equustek] 
that flows from Datalink carrying on business on the Internet, a business which 
would be commercially impossible without Google's facilitation'. See Google v 
Equustek Solutions [2017] 1 SCR 824. Regarding the issue of unilateralism see Yochai 
Benkler, 'Internet Regulation: A Case Study in the Problem of Unilateralism' 
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 171. 
37 Regarding the debate on Internet governance and the role of ICANN, see Lucia 
De Nardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (Yale University Press 2014); 
Milton Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (The 
MIT Press 2010); Jeanette Hoffman, Christian Katzenbach and Kirsten Gollatz, 
'Between coordination and regulation: Finding the governance in Internet 
governance' (2017) 19(9) New Media & Society 1406. 
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Internet shutdowns,38 the multilevel and decentralised governance of the 
internet has restricted the power of constitutional states to exercise their 
sovereignty. In the future, the development of new privately-developed 
technologies such as Blockchain and artificial intelligence could make this 
scenario still more complex. Decentralisation would disintermediate and 
delegate public functions to machines and distributed ledger technologies 
developed by private actors.39 
However, such considerations are not sufficient to explain why some 
governments have followed another path imposing their sovereign powers 
over online activities within their territory. It is necessary to bear in mind 
that not all public actors have chosen the same free-market approach 
concerning the internet. Particularly in countries where forms of surveillance 
and control over information are diffused, like China and the Arab states,40 
the internet has been subject to public controls leading to the blocking of 
some online services or the monitoring of data.41 This possibility seems to 
confirm the paternalistic theories of those scholars who have criticised the 
libertarian approach.42 In particular, according to Lessig, governments can 
impose their control over the internet through four modalities of regulation 
based on law, social rules, economic and network architecture.43 The last of 
these mechanisms constitutes the most effective way to regulate the internet 
since the regulator has the power to set the rules of the game online by 
                                                 
38 Justin Clark et al., The Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship, (2017) 
Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society Research Publication <http: 
//nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33084425> accessed 4 December 2018; 
Ronald Deibert  et al, Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering 
(MIT Press 2008). 
39 Regarding the role of distributed ledger technology and Blockchain, see, in 
particular, Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law 
(Harvard University Press 2018). 
40 Barney Warf, 'Geographies of Global Internet Censorship' (2011) 76 GeoJournal 1. 
41 Palfrey (n 23); Anupam Chander and Uyen P Le, 'Data Nationalism '(2015) 64(3) 
Emory Law Journal 677.  
42 Jack Goldsmith, 'Against Cyberanarchy' (1998) 65 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 1199; Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a 
Borderless World (Oxford University Press 2006). 
43 Lessig (n 16). 
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shaping the network structure.44 In the case of China, the adoption of the 
'Great Firewall' is one of the most evident examples of how states can express 
their sovereign powers over the internet by regulating the network's 
architectural dimension.45 
It is possible to observe that this approach has been adopted particularly by 
those states whose authoritative regimes are not bound by constitutional 
limits.46  Put another way, the more authoritarian the state, the more it would 
be able to regulate the internet and other digital technologies. Indeed, in such 
cases, internet censorship is merely a political decision to protect a general 
national interest prevailing over any other fundamental right or conflicting 
interest with the regime.  
In the opposite scenario, constitutional states need to consider the potential 
impact of regulatory burdens on fundamental rights. Here, the role of 
constitutional law clearly emerges. Unlike authoritarian regimes, where the 
level of fundamental rights protection could be absent or low, in 
constitutional states the need to respect fundamental rights and economic 
freedoms of businesses has allowed private actors to enjoy broad margins of 
autonomy. Looking at platforms from an EU constitutional standpoint, such 
entities are private actors. As a result, they can rely on their freedom to 
conduct business as recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (the 'Charter') together with the EU fundamental freedoms, 
                                                 
44 Francesca Musiani, 'Network Architecture as Internet Governance' (2013) 2(4) 
Internet Policy Review <https://policyreview.info/node/208/pdf> accessed 20 June 
2018. 
45 Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, 'Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering 
in China' (2003) Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 62. 
46 Justin Clark, Robert Faris, Ryan Morrison-Westphal, Helmi Noman, Casey Tilton 
and Jonathan Zittrain, 'The Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship' 
(2017) Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society Research Publication <http:// 
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33084425> accessed 15 October 2018; 
Ronald Deibert, Hohn Palfrey, Raphal Rohozinsky, Jonathan Zittrain and Janice 
Gross Stein, Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (MIT 
Press 2008). 
2019} Fundamental Rights Online 77 
 
especially, the freedom to provide services as set out in the Treaties.47 From 
a US constitutional perspective, platforms rely on a different constitutional 
basis to perform their business, in particular their freedom of speech as 
recognised by the First Amendment.48 In both cases, platforms enjoy a 
'constitutional safe area' whose boundaries can be restricted only by the 
prominence of other fundamental rights.  
These economic and constitutional considerations are not sufficient to 
explain how the liberal approach to private actors in the online dimension has 
led to a transformation of their liberties into power. In this laissez-faire 
scenario, data and information have started to be collected globally by private 
actors through the possibilities derived from new digital technologies, firstly, 
by the internet and, subsequently, by the development of automated 
technologies.  
Whereas in the information society bits have allowed private actors to gather 
information and develop their business, today algorithms allow such actors to 
process it by extracting value from huge amounts of data (referred to as 'Big 
Data'). Since data and information constitute the new non-rival and non-
fungible oil of the algorithmic society,49 their processing has led to an 
increase in the power of some private actors in the digital age where the 
monopoly over knowledge does not belong exclusively to public actors but 
also to some private businesses.50  
                                                 
47 Charter art 16 and TFEU arts 56-62. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union [2012] OJ C326/12. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/12. 
48 US Constitution, First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' 
49 'The World's Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil But Data' The Economist 
(6 May 2017) <www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-
resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data> accessed 28 May 2018. See, also, Michele Loi 
and Paul-Olivier Dehaye, ‘If Data Is The New Oil, When Is The Extraction of 
Value From Data Unjust?’ (2017) 7(2) Philosophy and Public Issues 137. 
50 This phenomenon can be described by applying the theory of the 'Nodes and 
Grades' theorised by Murray. According to such theory, some entities in the 
network can influence the structure of the cyberspace more than others and this 
78 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 11 No. 2 
 
Online platforms can be defined as gatekeepers who control the flow of 
information.51 The possibility to autonomously set the rules according to 
which data flows and is processed leads to an increase in the discretion of 
private actors.52 From a transnational constitutional perspective, this 
phenomenon can be described as the rise of a civil constitution outside 
institutionalised politics. According to Teubner, the constitution of a global 
society cannot result from a unitary and institutionalised effort but emerges 
from the constitutionalisation of autonomous subsystems of that global 
society.53 
This complex framework of new challenges has contributed to marginalising 
those public actors who have delegated some of their tasks to online 
platforms instead of imposing their sovereign powers in order to avoid the 
expansion of new private powers. This shift of power can be interpreted not 
only as the consequence of economic and technical forces but also as the 
result of the decreasing influence of constitutional states in the field of 
internet governance. In particular, the choice to delegate public functions to 
online platforms is linked to the opportunity to rely on entities whose 
services are based on the workings of the online environment. Private 
conglomerates like Alphabet or Facebook enjoy more resources compared to 
public actors, especially due to their involvement in managing other public 
interests such as health and education. Indeed, platforms run their business 
activities by virtue of the internet, which is the channel through which their 
services operate. 
These observations illustrate only some of the developments that have 
allowed private actors to expand their regulatory influence over the internet. 
                                                 
peculiarity transforms some actors in the regulators of the cyberspace. See Andrew 
Murray, 'Nodes and Gravity in Virtual Space' (2011) 5(2) Legisprudence 195.  
51 Emily B Laidlaw, 'A Framework for Identifying Internet Information 
Gatekeepers, in International Review of Law' (2012) 24(3) Internet and Technology 
263; Jonhatan A Zittrain, 'History of Online Gatekeeping' (2006) 19(2) Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 253; Scott Burris, Peter Drahos and Clifford 
Shearing, 'Nodal governance' (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30.  
52 Yochai Benkler, 'Degrees of Freedom Dimension and Power' (2016) 145 Daedalus 
18. 
53 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and 
Globalization, (Oxford University Press 2012). 
2019} Fundamental Rights Online 79 
 
This is why some authors have referred to this phenomenon as the rise of the 
law of the platforms.54 In order to understand this situation from a 
constitutional perspective, the next sections will address the exercise of 
delegated and autonomous powers by online platforms. 
III. DELEGATED EXERCISE OF QUASI-PUBLIC POWERS ONLINE 
Having explained the main economic, technological and constitutional 
development which led to the shift of power on the internet from public 
actors to private ones, it is now time to examine the delegation of public 
functions to online platforms. 
More than fifteen years ago, scholars already began to label this phenomenon 
the 'invisible handshake' according to which public actors would rely on 
private actors online to pursue their aims.55 Among such scholars, Reidenberg 
has defined a set of modalities to ensure the enforcement of legal rules 
online.56 In particular, Reidenberg has described three types of enforcement: 
network intermediaries,57 network engineering and technological 
instruments.58 
Regarding the first approach, Reidenberg has explained how public actors 
can rely on online platforms in order to ensure the enforcement of public 
policies online. Due to the diffused nature of the cyberspace, states do not 
possess the resources to pursue each wrongdoer acting in the digital 
environment. Examples in this field are peer-to-peer and torrent mechanisms 
which demonstrate the complexities required to investigate, prosecute and 
sanction millions of infringers every day. In such situations, online providers 
                                                 
54 Luca Belli, Pedro A Francisco and Nicolo Zingales, 'Law of the Land or Law of the 
Platform? Beware of the Privatisation of Regulation and Police' in Luca Belli and 
Nicolo Zingales (eds), How Platforms are Regulated and How They Regulate Us (FGV 
Direito Rio 2017). 
55 Micheal D Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, 'The Invisible Handshake: The 
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment' (2003) 8 Virginia Journal of 
Law & Technology 1. 
56 Joel R Reidenberg, 'States and Internet enforcement' (2004) 1 University of 
Ottawa Law & Techonology Journal 213. 
57 Ibid 222. 
58 Ibid 225. 
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can function as 'gateways points' (or intermediaries) to identify and block 
illicit behaviours acting directly on the network structure. According to 
Reidenberg, the architecture of the cyberspace prescribes its rules 
constituting the basis of the digital regulation.59 In this way, this approach 
allows governments to regain control over the internet using platforms as 
proxies in order to reaffirm their national sovereignty online. 
In the next subsections, the cases of online content management and the 
right to be forgotten online will provide two examples of how public actors 
have relied on online platforms as proxies in order to ensure the enforcement 
of public policy online. 
1. Online Content Management 
The first example of such delegation is seen in the implicitly recognised role 
of online platforms in managing online content hosted in their digital spaces. 
At the end of the last century, by virtue of their 'passive' function, these 
actors were treated as mere intermediaries of products and services. Both the 
US and EU approach to online service providers' liability are clear examples. 
The Communications Decency Act,60 together with the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act61 and the e-Commerce Directive,62 have introduced a special 
regime of exceptions to the liability of online intermediaries, acknowledging, 
in abstracto, their non-involvement in the creation of content.63 
This allocation of public functions technically consists in imposing 
obligations to online intermediaries to remove online content once they 
become aware of its illicit nature ('notice and takedown'). As already 
mentioned, public actors have generally considered platforms neither 
                                                 
59 Joel R Reidenberg, 'Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules through Technology' (1997-1998) 76 Texas Law Review 553.  
60 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) [1996]. 
61 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S. Code § 512. 
62 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') 
[2000] OJ L 178/1. 
63 Andrej Savin, European Internet Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017); Mariarosaria 
Taddeo and Luciano Floridi (eds), The Responsibilities of Online Service Providers 
(Springer 2017). 
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accountable nor responsible for transmitted or hosted contents (i.e. safe 
harbour), provided that platforms are unaware of the presence of illicit 
content in their digital rooms.64 On the one hand, the liability of online 
intermediaries in relation to third-party content has always been limited, in 
order to foster the development of information society services, thus 
protecting freedom of economic initiative (or free speech in the US 
framework). On the other hand, this special regime aims to avoid that entities 
which do not have effective control over third-party hosted content are 
considered liable for hosting them.65   
Lacking any procedural obligations, this system of liability has entrusted 
online intermediaries with the power to autonomously decide whether to 
remove or block content based on the risk to be held liable. Since online 
platforms are privately run, these actors would try to avoid the risks to be 
sanctioned for non-compliance with this duty by removing or blocking even 
content whose illicit nature is not fully evident.66 Indeed, platforms will likely 
focus on minimising this economic risk rather than adopting a fundamental 
rights-based approach. 
As a result, such publicly delegated activity implies, inter alia, that platforms 
can take decisions affecting fundamental rights and, in particular, freedom of 
expression and privacy.67 At the same time, this responsibility would also 
imply that they should implement effective and appropriate safeguards in 
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order to ensure the prevention of unintended removal of lawful content and 
respect the fundamental rights in question.68  
However, this is not the current situation. Several drawbacks need to be 
addressed. Firstly, a private actor such as an online platform should not 
autonomously decide whether content is illicit in the absence of a legal review 
or a judicial order. If platforms can determine the lawfulness of online 
content, they are then exercising a function which traditionally belongs to 
the public authority.69 When users notify the hosting providers about the 
presence of alleged illicit content, such actors need to assess the lawfulness of 
the content in question in order to remove it promptly. Lacking any 
regulation of this process, online platforms are free to assess whether a 
certain online content is unlawful and make a decision regarding its 
consequent removal or block. As a result, this anti-system has led platforms 
to acquire an increasing influence on the balancing of users' fundamental 
rights. For example, the choice to remove or block defamatory content or 
hate speech videos interferes with the right to freedom of expression of the 
users. At the same time, the decision about the need to protect other 
conflicting rights such as the protection of minors or human dignity is left to 
the decision of private actors without any public guarantee.  
More importantly, however, the primary issue is the lack of any transparent 
procedure or redress mechanisms allowing users to appeal against a decision 
regarding the removal or blocking of the signalled content. For example, 
platforms are neither obliged to explain the reasoning of the removal or 
blocking of online content, nor to provide remedies against their decisions. 
Here, the impact of the platforms' powers on fundamental rights is evident. 
Lacking any regulation, users cannot rely on any legal remedy in order to 
complain against a violation of their fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression or privacy.  
                                                 
68 E-Commerce Directive (n 62) Recital 42. 
69 Recently, the Court of Appeal of Rome has clarified that, in order to consider an 
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2. The Right to Be Forgotten Online 
Similar considerations also apply to the enforcement of the right to be 
forgotten in the online dimension.70 Before the adoption of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (hereinafter 'GDPR')71 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ('CJEU') recognised for the first time at the EU level the 
right to be forgotten online in the landmark decision Google Spain in 2014.72  
Even without analysing the well-known facts of the case, one can observe that 
such a decision finds its roots in the necessity to ensure the protection of the 
fundamental right to privacy in the digital dimension.73 Indeed, the Court has 
brought out a new right to be forgotten as a part of the right to privacy in the 
digital world. In order to achieve this aim, the CJEU, as a public actor, by 
interpreting the framework of fundamental rights in the EU together with 
the dispositions of directive 95/46,74 has de facto entrusted private actors (in 
this case, search engines) to delist online content without removing 
information on the motion of the individual concerned. Indeed, the search 
engine is the only actor which can ensure the enforcement of the right to be 
forgotten online since it can manage those online spaces where the link to be 
'forgotten' are published. Hence, the data subject has the right to ask the 
search engine to obtain the erasure of the link to the information relating to 
him or her from a list of web results based on his or her name. 
It is possible to argue that the interpretation of the CJEU has unveiled a legal 
basis for data subjects to enforce their rights against private actors. The EU 
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Court has recognised a right to be forgotten online through the 
interpretation of directive 95/46, applying horizontally (de facto) Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter.75  
However, unlike in the case of content management, both the CJEU and the 
Article 29 Working Party have identified some criteria according to which 
platforms shall assess the request of the data subject.76 Thus, online platforms 
do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in balancing data subjects' rights. 
Moreover, the recent European codification of the right to erasure has 
contributed to clarifying the criteria to apply the right to delist. These 
considerations are also relevant for the US environment since the 
extraterritorial effect of the GDPR will affect US entities.77 In particular, 
according to Article 17 GDPR, the data subject has the right to obtain from 
the controller, without undue delay, the erasure of personal data concerning 
him or her according to specific grounds,78 and excluding such rights in other 
cases,79 for example when the processing is necessary for exercising the right 
to freedom of expression and information. 
Although the data subject can rely on a legal remedy by lodging a complaint 
to the public authority in order to have their rights protected, the autonomy 
of platforms continues to remain a relevant concern. When addressing users' 
requests for delisting, the balancing of fundamental rights is left to the 
assessment of the online platforms. Even in this case, the issue is similar to 
that of the notice and takedown mechanism since search engines enjoy a 
broad margin of discretion when balancing users' fundamental rights and 
enforcing their decisions. For example, search engines will continue to decide 
whether the exception relating to the freedom to impart information applies 
                                                 
75 Charter (n 47). According to art 7: 'Everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
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in a specific case. Moreover, search engines conduct the delisting process 
relying only on their internal assessments based on the facts provided by the 
data subject and, according to EU law, they are not obliged to provide any 
reason for their decision or redress mechanism.  
Therefore, the online enforcement of the right to be forgotten is another 
example of the discretionary power that platforms exercise when balancing 
and enforcing fundamental rights online. As in the case of content 
management, the impossibility of assessing how private actors decide a 
specific case due to the low level of transparency of platforms' decision-
making processes is one of the main issues at stake. 
IV. AUTONOMOUS EXERCISE OF QUASI-PUBLIC POWERS ONLINE: 
TOWARDS A PRIVATE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OR AN ABSOLUTE 
REGIME?  
These two examples provide a picture of the aforementioned libertarian 
theories,80 if only as a romantic memory belonging to an internet which has 
radically changed its form.  
The delegation of public functions is not the only challenging phenomenon 
for the traditional boundaries of constitutional law. The general autonomy 
afforded to online platforms in performing their activities has made this 
situation more complex. The technological evolution together with a liberal 
constitutional approach has allowed online platforms not only to become 
proxies of public actors but also to rely on their private autonomy in order to 
set their own rules of procedures. This is particularly clear by focusing on ToS 
which are contracts according to which platforms unilaterally establish what 
users can do in their online rooms and how their data is processed.81  
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From a private law perspective, these agreements can be considered mere 
boilerplate contracts, where clauses are based on standard contractual terms 
that are usually included in other agreements.82 Users cannot exercise any 
negotiation power but, as an adhering party, may only decide whether or not 
to accept pre-established conditions. 
At first glance, the significance of this situation under a public (or rather 
constitutional) law perspective may not be evident, both since boilerplate 
contracts are very common even in the offline world and since online 
platforms' ToS do not seem to differ from the traditional contractual 
model.83  
For the average user, however, there is one main difference which deserves to 
be taken seriously into consideration. Unlike the parties to a contract in the 
atomic world, online platforms can enforce contractual clauses provided for 
in the ToS directly without the need to rely on a public mechanism such as a 
judicial order. For instance, the removal or blocking of online content is 
performed directly by online platforms without the involvement of any 
public body ordering the infringing party to fulfil the related contractual 
obligations. Here, the code assumes the function of the law.84 By relying on 
the network architecture as a modality of regulation, platforms can directly 
enforce their rights through a quasi-executive function. This private 
enforcement is the result of an asymmetrical technological position in 
respect of users. Platforms are the rulers of their digital space since they can 
manage the activities which occur within their boundaries. Such power, 
which is not delegated by public authorities but results from the network 
architecture itself, is of special concern from a constitutional perspective 
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since it represents a form of self-regulation and disintermediation of the role 
of public actors in ensuring the enforcement of fundamental rights online.85 
Such functionality is usually defined, but not limited, by the platform's ToS, 
which, similarly to the law, can be considered as the legal basis according to 
which platforms exercise their powers. By defining the criteria according to 
which decisions will be enforced, as well as the procedural and technical tools 
underpinning their ToS, platforms establish the rules governing their 
community, exercising a sort of quasi-legislative power. Although this 
autonomy is limited in some areas, for example data protection,86 the global 
application of their services and the lack of any legal rules regulating online 
content management leave a significant amount of political discretion in the 
hands of platforms when drafting their ToS.87  
Behind these normative and executive functions, the two above-mentioned 
examples have shown how platforms can perform a function which is similar 
to that of the judiciary, namely the balancing of fundamental rights. When 
receiving a notice from users asking for content removal or the delisting of 
online links, in order to render a decision, platforms assess which 
fundamental rights or interest should prevail in the case at issue. Taking as an 
example the alleged defamatory content signalled by a user, the platform 
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could freely decide whether such content is being lawfully protected by right 
to inform or not.   
One of the main issues to be addressed is how platforms exercise legal 
safeguards. Whilst it may be possible to refer to the law of the notice provider 
or that established in the ToS, it is not possible to concretely assess the level 
of compliance with the chosen legal standard due to the lack of transparency 
in the online platforms' decision-making.88 
Furthermore, adding another layer of complexity – and concern – is the 
possibility that these activities can be executed by using automated decision-
making technologies. On the one hand, algorithms can be considered as 
technical instruments facilitating a platform's various functionalities, such as 
the organisation of online content. But, on the other hand, such technologies 
can constitute technical self-executing rules, obviating even the need for a 
human executive or judicial function. In particular, the primary concern is 
the low level of decision-making transparency89 which strongly affect users' 
fundamental rights.90  
This technological asymmetry constitutes the true difference from 
traditional boilerplates contracts. Their enforcement is strictly dependent 
on the role of the public authority in ensuring the respect of the rights and 
obligations which the parties have agreed upon. This could be considered 
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another clue to the exercise of quasi-public power by online platforms. Users, 
as citizens, are usually subject to the exercise of a legitimate authority which, 
in the framework of the internet, seems to be exercised by the platforms 
through instruments of private law mixed with technology (the law of the 
platforms). 
Within this framework, if a quasi-public role of platforms in the online 
environment is recognised, it would be possible to argue that the power 
exercised by online platforms mirrors, to some extent, the same discretion 
which an absolute power can exercise over its community. From a 
constitutional perspective, it could be observed that, in the case of platforms, 
the three traditional public powers are centralised; the definition of the rules 
to assess online contents, the decisions over the users' complaints and their 
enforcement are practised by the platform without any separation of powers. 
Constitutionalism has primarily been based on the idea of the separation of 
powers, as theorised by Charles De Secondat.91 In contrast, here it is possible 
to highlight the rise of a private order whose characteristics do not mirror 
constitutional provisions but is more similar to an absolute power. In 
particular, this phenomenon cannot be defined as the rise of a 'private 
constitutional order' since neither the separation of powers nor the 
protection of rights are granted in this system.92 Rather, the above-
mentioned framework has shown how the absence of the separation of 
powers in platform activities is one of the main reasons that explain the 
strong impact of their activities on users' fundamental rights. Indeed, the 
internet has allowed the concentration of private powers in the hands of 
online platforms which exercise them with absolute discretion. This has led 
some authors to refer to this phenomenon as a return to feudalism,93 or to the 
ancien régime.94  
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Citizen, 26 August 1789.  
93 James Grimmelmann, 'Virtual World Feudalism' (2009) 118 Yale Law Journal 
Pocket Part 126. 
94 Belli and Venturini (n 81). 
90 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 11 No. 2 
 
V. SOLUTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
The challenges analysed above question not only the role of public actors in 
regulating the internet, but, more importantly, the possibility that 
constitutional law is able to limit private powers whose nature is more global 
than local.95 In other words, this scenario allows looking at online platforms 
not only as private actors whose activity is based on their freedom to conduct 
business or their right to free speech but, in some cases, as entities capable of 
exercising powers which mirror those of public actors. 
In this scenario, constitutional states are faced with a paradoxical situation. 
On the one hand, in order not to hinder the aforementioned liberties, public 
actors are encouraged to recognise a high degree of economic freedom 
allowing private actors to exercise their autonomy. However, as already 
explained, this approach has led online platforms to enjoy broad margins of 
autonomy through instruments based on technology and private law. Unlike 
public actors, platforms are neither obliged to pursue public interest, nor to 
protect fundamental rights. On the other hand, even if constitutional states 
intend to establish a system of pervasive public control over online content, 
the overregulation of private activities could increase the risk of public and 
private censorship.96 
Hence, the two main questions are whether and how constitutional states can 
react to this paradoxical situation and what the role of constitutional law 
should be when developing a new framework. 
Liberal constitutionalism has traditionally been characterised by a vertical 
dichotomy where private actors claim the respect of their rights vis-à-vis 
public actors. Historically, the first bills of rights were designed to restrict the 
power of governments rather than interfere with the private sphere; in fact, 
at that time, it was thought that the private sphere needed to be protected 
from the state through the recognition of rights and liberties. As a result, 
constitutional provisions have been interpreted as either providing a limit to 
the coercive power of the state or as a source of positive obligation resting on 
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public actors in order to protect constitutional rights and liberties. From this 
point of view, the threat to individual rights does not result from the exercise 
of freedoms by private actors but rather emanates from the state, the only 
entity which can exercise legitimate power.  
Global dynamics and, in particular, the internet have affected this paradigm, 
allowing private actors to gather power in new and significant areas. In light 
of this, it is perhaps no coincidence that the number of situations where 
transnational corporations have violated fundamental rights is on the rise.97 
However, the transnational character of businesses such as online platforms 
and their inherently private nature should not justify the violation of 
fundamental rights.  
At this point, the distinction between public and private actors acquires a 
specific relevance. Since only public actors are bound to respect 
constitutional provisions, two solutions must be considered: on the one hand, 
the establishment of new safeguards in order to provide legal instruments to 
reduce the transparency gap and protect users' fundamental rights. On the 
other hand, the vertical scope of fundamental rights needs to be questioned 
in order to understand whether it is fit-for-purpose in a globalised world.98  
Hence, it is time to address the situation by proposing solutions to this 
complex issue. The following subsections will provide at least two cumulative 
proposals. The first perspective addresses the regulation of online platforms' 
decision-making processes. This proposal is a response to the lack of 
transparency in platforms' decision-making when they perform (delegated or 
autonomous) quasi-public functions. In contrast, the second proposal 
questions the vertical structure of constitutionalism and its impact on the 
protection of fundamental rights in the online environment. 
1. The Old-School Solution: Nudging Online Platforms to Behave as Public Actors 
The first solution aims to transcend the dichotomy between public and 
private actors by proposing new rights for users. The narrative regarding the 
need to protect platforms' economic freedom (or the right to free speech in 
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the US framework) and, consequently, the development of digital services, 
could be disruptive to users' fundamental rights. Moreover, it could also 
encourage private actors to acquire even more power due to the 
opportunities offered by new digital technologies.  
In order to reduce such risks, it would be necessary for public actors to 
become more proactive; although legal remedies are obvious instruments for 
users to enforce their rights vis-à-vis online platforms, it is necessary to focus 
not only on reactive measures such as legal remedies but also on proactive 
ones. The current level of threat to fundamental rights should be decisive for 
public actors when deciding whether or not to regulate private activities and, 
consequently, restrict their freedom to conduct business or their right to free 
speech. As the European Court of Human Rights has explained, there is a 
positive obligation for public actors to limit risks to violation of fundamental 
rights.99 This approach is thus based on the following consideration: if there 
is a serious risk for fundamental rights, public actors should act within the 
scope of their role to limit this interference. By regulating private activities, 
public actors can require online platforms to comply with transparency 
obligations. 
The lack of transparency in algorithmic decision-making processes increases 
the asymmetry between users and platforms.100 In order to address this issue, 
public actors could recognise new user rights whose proactive aim should be 
to reduce the transparency gap in the decision-making processes of online 
platforms. The possibility for users to obtain justification for automated 
outcomes or have access to redress mechanisms would mitigate this 
situation.101 Put differently, these new rights would allow users to rely on a 
                                                 
99 See, for example, Von Hannover v Germany 40 EHRR 1. See Lech Garlicki, 
'Relations between Private Actors and the European Convention on Human 
Rights' in Andra Sajo ́and Renata Uitz (eds), The Constitution in Private Relations: 
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100 See Section IV of this work. 
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'human translation' of the algorithmic process. Such steps are particularly 
important since they allow users not only to rely on proactive and reactive 
measures but also to enhance the human dimension in the algorithmic 
process. This would help create the basis for the development of a sustainable 
digital humanism rather than an opaque techno-authoritarianism. 
At least within the EU framework, the Commission has recently attempted 
to follow a soft-law path to adopt this approach. The idea is to nudge 
platforms to make their activities more transparent without merely focusing 
on recognising the right of the user to claim damages for violations of their 
fundamental rights. In particular, the Commission has recently issued, inter 
alia, a Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online,102 as well as 
a Communication on tackling illegal content online,103 then implemented in 
the Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content 
online.104 Taken together, the Code and the Recommendation can be 
considered a first attempt by the EU to reduce its marginalisation vis-à-vis 
online platforms by providing a form of 'administrativisation' of platforms' 
activities. This choice could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of, on the 
one hand, the role of online platforms in ensuring the enforcement of public 
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102 Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, available at 
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policies online and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that, by virtue of 
their role, such private actors should act responsibly.105 
According to the Recommendation, platforms are first of all encouraged to 
publish, in a clear, easily understandable and sufficiently detailed way, the 
criteria according to which they manage the removal or blocking of access to 
online contents.106 This is a clear example of how the Commission is trying to 
improve the degree of predictability concerning content removal procedures 
in order to reduce platforms' discretion vis-à-vis users' requests. 
Further, the Recommendation provides guidelines regarding the notice and 
takedown process. Although there are some exceptions,107 once the notice 
provider has submitted its request to the hosting provider, the latter should 
send a confirmation of receipt and inform the former of its decision about 
the content at stake.108 Moreover, in the case of removal or blocking of access 
to the signalled online content, platforms should, without undue delay, 
inform users about the decision, setting out its reasoning as well as the 
possibility to contest the decision.109 This system seems to mirror an 
administrative process whereby the notice provider, as a citizen, can rely on 
a specific (public) procedure according to which the hosting provider, as a 
public body, complies with established rules.  
In turn, the content provider should have the possibility to contest the 
decision by submitting a 'counter-notice' within a 'reasonable period of time'. 
If the counter-notice provides grounds for considering whether the noticed 
content was lawful, the hosting provider should review its decision. The 
provider should also make access to such content available without undue 
delay and without prejudice to the possibility to define and enforce its ToS.110 
In this process, there could also be the ex-post opposition of the content 
provider, as a plaintiff/defendant. This latter process seems to mirror a 
                                                 
105 Commission, 'Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and 
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judicial environment where the notice provider, as a plaintiff, lodges a 
complaint, and the hosting provider, as a judge, upholds it.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission has made strides towards a 
more transparent EU online environment,111 this soft-law approach has 
potential drawbacks. In particular, since this approach does not establish 
mandatory obligations, online platforms can freely choose whether to 
implement such procedures. Even more importantly, the Commission has 
not limited the discretion of platforms' decision-making processes, leaving a 
margin of autonomy similar to that enjoyed by a judge or an administrative 
authority. 
By comparison, since June 2017, Germany has taken a different approach. A 
new German law, known as NetzDG,112 was adopted obliging online 
platforms with more than two million users in Germany to take actions in 
order to handle illegal content hosted by them within 24 hours after having 
received a notice.113  
Compared to the changes that has taken place in the EU framework, it is 
interesting to observe that the US framework remains much the same. The 
constitutional predominance of the First Amendment in the US continues to 
shield these actors from any form of regulation. However, it is worth 
mentioning the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and the Allow 
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), also known 
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as SESTA-FOSTA.114 Both measures affect the exception established by 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act according to which '[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider'.115 It would be possible to consider this approach as a step 
towards stricter content management within the US framework.116 
These developments represent the first indication towards the end of the 
marginalisation of public actors in the online sphere.117 Indeed, obliging 
online platforms to comply with specific procedures – and recognising the 
possibility for users to rely on clear rules in order to enforce their rights – 
would constitute the expression of the sovereign powers of the state over 
online actors. 
Within this framework, platforms will continue to enjoy a broad margin of 
discretion. However, the promotion of transparency in decision-making 
processes and available redress mechanisms could guarantee more safeguards 
for users than in the current scenario. On the one hand, the proposed 
measures mitigate the impact on fundamental rights resulting from the 
absence of any accountability. On the other hand, they do not burden 
platforms with ex-ante monitoring obligations.  
2. The Innovative Solution: Enforcement of Fundamental Rights  
Whereas proposing a regulatory solution to the above-mentioned challenges 
is a largely traditional approach, the following perspective is more innovative 
and thus needs further analysis. It would be based on a reconsideration of the 
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traditional boundaries of constitutional law and the distinction between 
private and public actors in exercising public tasks online.  
This approach questions the horizontal effect doctrine of fundamental rights 
regarding the role of online platforms exercising private powers on the 
internet. As Tushnet has sustained, if the doctrine of horizontal effect is 
considered 'as a response to the threat to liberty posed by concentrated 
private power, the solution is to require that all private actors conform to the 
norms applicable to governmental actors'.118 
Traditionally, constitutional rules apply vertically only to public actors in 
order to ensure the liberty and autonomy of private actors. On the contrary, 
the horizontal doctrine extends constitutional obligations also to private 
actors. Unlike the liberal spirit of the vertical approach, this theory rejects a 
rigid separation between public and private actors in constitutional law. Put 
another way, the horizontal doctrine is concerned with the issue of whether 
and to what extent constitutional rights can have impact on the relationships 
between private actors. As observed by Gardbaum, '[t]hese alternatives refer 
to whether constitutional rights regulate only the conduct of governmental 
actors in their dealings with private individuals (vertical) or also relations 
between private individuals (horizontal)'.119 
The horizontal effect can result from constitutional obligations on private 
parties to respect fundamental rights (i.e. direct effect) or the application of 
fundamental rights through judicial interpretation (i.e. indirect effect). Only 
in the first case would a private entity have the right to rely directly on 
constitutional provisions to claim the violation of its rights vis-à-vis other 
private parties.  
Within the US framework, the Supreme Court has usually applied the 
vertical approach where the application of the horizontal approach – known 
in the US as the 'state action doctrine' – would be considered the 
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exception.120 Consequently, US constitutional rights lack horizontal effect 
not only in abstracto but also in relation to online platforms.121 Only the 
prohibition on slavery as provided for by the Thirteenth Amendment applies 
to public and private actors.122 
The horizontal extension of fundamental rights is less rigid in the EU 
environment. One possible explanation for such differences could be the 
impact of social democratic openness of Member States. According to 
Tushnet, states which provide social welfare rights in their constitutions 
more readily apply the horizontal effect doctrine.123  
Within the EU framework, the debate about the horizontal direct effect has 
not only focused on national constitutions but also on the EU dimension 
itself.124 Traditionally, the effects of the rights recognised directly under EU 
primary law have been capable of horizontal application. In particular, the 
CJEU has applied both the horizontal effect and the positive obligation 
doctrines regarding the four fundamental freedoms. In the Van Gend En Loos 
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case, the CJEU stated: 'Independently of the legislation of Member States, 
Community law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also 
intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage'.125 This definition remained unclear until the Court specified its 
meaning in the Walrave case126 which, together with Bosman127 and Deliege,128 
can be considered the first acknowledgement of the horizontal effect of the 
EU fundamental freedoms.129 
However, if this is the case in the context of the EU Treaties, the same 
judicial activism cannot be seen in the framework of the Charter.130 Since its 
entry into legally binding force with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Charter has been recognised as having 'the same legal value as the Treaties'.131 
The difference in approach can be explained by looking at Article 51(1) of the 
Charter which seems to narrow the scope of application of the Charter to EU 
institutions and to the Member States in their implementation EU law.132 
Although this strict literal interpretation seems to narrow the possibilities of 
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horizontally enforcing fundamental rights, it is possible to argue that, under 
the EU constitutional perspective, a more extensive approach to 
horizontality is less problematic.133 The horizontal application of 
fundamental rights could constitute a limitation to the expansion of power 
by social subsystems.134 According to Teubner, the emergence of 
transnational regimes shows the limits of constitutions as means of 
regulation of the whole society since social sub-systems develop their own 
constitutional norms.135 Therefore, the horizontal effects doctrine can be 
considered a limit to the self-constitutionalising of private regulations by 
reconducting them to the constitutional framework. As a result, if the 
horizontal effect of fundamental rights is purely considered a problem of 
political power within society, an approach which excludes its application 
would hinder the teleological approach behind the horizontal doctrine, the 
aim of which is to protect individuals against unreasonable violation of their 
fundamental rights vis-à-vis private actors.  
However, it is necessary to highlight at least one of the main drawbacks of the 
general horizontal application of fundamental rights. Applying extensively 
this doctrine could lead to negative effects for legal certainty. Indeed, every 
private conflict can virtually be represented as a clash between different 
fundamental rights. The result could lead to the extension of constitutional 
obligations to every private relationship, thus hindering any possibility to 
foresee the consequences of a specific action or omission. Fundamental 
rights can be applied horizontally only ex post by courts through the balancing 
of the rights in question. This process could increase the degree of 
uncertainty as well as judicial activism, with evident consequences for the 
separation of powers and the rule of law.  
These concerns show the complexities of relying on the horizontal effect 
doctrine to generally limit the emergence of private powers. The above-
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mentioned issue can be overcome by limiting the application of this approach 
to only those cases where private actors exercise their autonomy as a result of 
a delegation of public functions. In particular, in the examples of platforms, 
although these entities cannot be considered public actors per se, their 
delegated public functions can be considered equal to those of public actors. 
In other words, it would be possible to envisage a definition of public law 
which is not fixed but it is able to extend to those cases where public actors 
entrust private actors with quasi-public functions through a delegation of 
powers. Indeed, users have legitimate expectation that if a public actor has 
entrusted a private one to pursue a public policy, it is necessary that those 
private actors be held accountable for any violation of users' fundamental 
rights. This approach would give users the right to bring claims related to 
violations of, for example, freedom of expression directly against platforms 
as entities performing delegated public functions. This mechanism would 
allow fundamental rights to become horizontally effective against the 
conduct or omission of actors evading their responsibilities and shielding 
their activities under a narrative based on freedoms and liberties.136 
Furthermore, where platforms exercise autonomous powers, a broad 
extension of the horizontal effect doctrine would transform these entities 
into public actors by default. For this reason, public actors could regulate 
online platforms' autonomy through due process obligations and 
accountability mechanisms in order not to leave the development of the 
digital environment in the hands of actors who enjoy significant power 
without pursuing any public interest. 
VI. CONCLUSION: DIGITAL HUMANISM V. TECHNO-
AUTHORITARIANISM 
Infinite scalability, non-rivalrousness and intangibility are the main 
characteristics of the information found in digital spaces. Although 
technology has played a crucial part in the evolution of the role of private 
actors in the online environment, at this point it cannot be denied that public 
actors have also facilitated the emergence of platforms' powers. Indeed, the 
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US and EU's choice to adopt a liberal constitutional approach to the internet, 
especially to online platforms, is one of the main causes of the shift from 
economic freedoms to new forms of private powers. Both the liberal 
constitutional approach and the possibilities coming from new digital 
technologies have resulted in entrusting private actors with regulatory 
powers over the internet. 
Moreover, the adoption of a liberal approach was not the only 'mistake' made 
by public actors. Constitutional states have entrusted online platforms with 
public policy tasks without clearly defining the boundaries of such activities. 
Such a transfer of responsibilities resulted from the recognition of platforms' 
role in establishing an effective online public regulatory framework. 
Although the delegation to private actors of public tasks should not be 
considered a negative phenomenon per se, how these actors exercise their 
'private sovereignty' should be regulated carefully since at present, unlike 
public actors in constitutional states, they are not obliged to respect 
fundamental rights. Whereas constitutional law has traditionally been 
developed to limit governmental powers, new private forces have emerged 
threatening the protection of fundamental rights. 
Both the case of content management and the right to be forgotten have 
shown this dynamic. In the first case, both the EU and the US have entrusted 
platforms with online content management functions. Due to the lack of any 
limitation, platforms are neither obliged to adopt a fundamental-rights based 
approach nor provide reasons for their decision or redress mechanisms. This 
leaves users without any legal remedy against the violation of their 
fundamental rights such as privacy or freedom of expression. The same 
consideration applies in the case of the right to be forgotten where, although 
the GDPR has established more criteria to assess the implementation of this 
right, search engines can autonomously decide how to assess and deal with 
users' requests.  
Furthermore, delegated powers are not the only source of concern. Behind 
delegated powers, platforms can exercise sovereign powers over their online 
spaces through instruments based on private law and technology. The 
possibility to balance and enforce users' fundamental rights through 
automated systems is an example of an absolute regime resulting from a mix 
of constitutional freedoms and technology. 
2019} Fundamental Rights Online 103 
 
In this scenario, the regulation of platforms' decision-making processes, as 
well as the horizontal effect doctrine of fundamental rights, can play a crucial 
role. Regarding the first solution, the establishment of new rights in the 
online environment such as, for example, the obligation to explain the 
reasons behind platforms' decision-making, would increase transparency. 
The same considerations apply to procedural rights such as the obligation to 
send a notice to the user when a decision of removal or blocking can affect his 
or her fundamental rights. Moreover, the second solution would lead to 
recognising the public role of platforms when exercising functions that 
mirror those of public authorities. The result of this extension would give 
users the possibility to directly enforce their fundamental rights vis-à-vis 
private actors.  
Through a process of digital humanism, these new rights would aim to 
enhance the human awareness in the algorithmic process. Importantly, this 
would reduce the threat of techno-authoritarianism and the possibility for 
private actors to leave privately developed technologies to determine the 
standard of protection of fundamental rights online.
